United Nations S/2018/783

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 August 2018
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 27 August 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period 25–27 August 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Nebenzia**

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Annex to the letter dated 27 August 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (25 August 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported 15 incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: 9 in Aleppo, 5 in Ladhiqiyah and 1 in Hama.

The Turkish representative office has reported two incidents of gunfire: one in Aleppo and one in Idlib.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides has not carried out any humanitarian operations.

In total, 1,906 humanitarian operations have been carried out. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,937.61 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 209 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 89,954 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (26 August 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported 13 incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: 9 in Aleppo, 3 in Ladhiqiyah and 1 in Hama.

The Turkish representative office has not reported any incidents of gunfire.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides has carried out one humanitarian operation. In Abdin and Jamlah, Qunaytirah Governorate, 600 food parcels with a total weight of 2.5 tons were distributed.

In total, 1,907 humanitarian operations have been carried out. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,940.11 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 326 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 90,280 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (27 August 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported 15 incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: 9 in Aleppo, 5 in Ladhiqiyah and 1 in Idlib.

The Turkish representative office has reported one incident of gunfire in Aleppo Governorate.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides has carried out one humanitarian operation. In Mazlum, Dayr al-Zawr Governorate, 650 food parcels with a total weight of 2.8 tons were distributed to residents.

In total, 1,908 humanitarian operations have been carried out. The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,942.91 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 242 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 90,522 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

United Nations S/2018/784

Security Council

Distr.: General
31 August 2018
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 27 August 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you the position of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the fifty-fourth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017) and 2401 (2018) (S/2018/777).

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic regrets that the authors of the reports of the Secretary-General and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) continue to take a negative, politicized and hostile approach to the Syrian Arab Republic and its institutions. It also regrets that, in the report under consideration, the authors continue to ignore its concerns and the questions that it posed to the relevant Secretariat officials and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs in its responses to the fifty-first, fifty-second and fifty-third reports, as well as to previous reports. The relevant reports of the Secretary-General would have been more credible and professional if the authors had provided a reasonable response to those questions.

As was the case with previous reports, the current report utterly fails to convey the true humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and what the Syrian people need to alleviate their suffering and increase their resilience. Indeed, the reports are still being used to fragment international efforts, which should instead be focused on combating terrorism in Syria and halting the financing of terrorism, so that Syrians can live in safety and dignity and prosper.

The Syrian Government reiterates that if OCHA continues to take this politicized approach when preparing reports, it will harm the reputation and credibility of the United Nations and will further only the agendas of certain influential States in the Security Council and the Governments of other States in the region.

What follows is an overview of the position of the Syrian Government with respect to the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and the report under consideration:

- Day by day, through the efforts of its institutions, with the support of its people and with international backing from the true friends of Syria, who believe in the principles of international law, the Syrian State has achieved important successes on the ground. It is making progress towards liberating Syrian

territory from the armed terrorist groups that have spread out among civilians, used them as human shields, exploited them, recruited their children and appropriated the humanitarian assistance that was intended for them. The achievements and momentous efforts of the national institutions of Syria have made it possible to support the Syrian people and ensure that United Nations assistance reaches them. The most recent such achievement was the liberation of areas in southern Syria from the armed terrorist groups deployed there, particularly Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Nusrah Front. That development enhanced humanitarian access and facilitated the return of Syrian displaced persons and refugees to their homes in southern Syria as soon as they were liberated and cleared of the mines that had been planted by the terrorists. The United Nations should have praised these victories in the war on terrorism instead of criticizing those responsible for them.

- The Syrian Arab Republic reiterates that it rejects the use of the term "non-State armed opposition" with respect to armed terrorist groups that were deployed in the south, especially the terrorist ISIL and Nusrah Front organizations. The authors of the report used that term although they are aware that those organizations are on the Security Council sanctions lists pertaining to ISIL and Al-Qaida and associated entities and individuals. The Syrian Arab Republic also rejects the authors' characterization of the members of the White Helmets terrorist organization as "humanitarian actors", especially given that the Governments of certain Western States have used that organization to provide intelligence and logistical support to the ISIL and Nusrah Front terrorist organizations, and to manufacture incidents that are designed mislead the global public with regard to the alleged use of chemical weapons use in Syria. Moreover, the members of that organization have taken part directly, together with ISIL and Nusrah Front terrorists, in terrorist attacks against Syrians and Syrian State institutions. They are terrorist mercenaries whose mission ended with the elimination of the armed terrorist groups whose operations in Syria they had been ordered to support. The welcome extended by Israel and Jordan and certain Western States to those terrorists is proof of collusion between their Governments and those terrorist lackeys.

On the subject of designations, my Government is still surprised that, in their reports, the authors' have repeatedly failed to explicitly describe ISIL and the Nusrah Front and their affiliated and allied organizations, such as the Khalid ibn al-Walid Army, as terrorists.

The Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms that the use of such politicized designations by the authors clearly demonstrates that they are adhering to the political agendas of certain States. Moreover, it emphasizes that it would be tantamount to direct involvement in terrorism in Syria for any international organization or United Nations entity to cooperate with or support the White Helmets.

- The Syrian Arab Republic is astonished that the authors continue to inflate the importance of isolated incidents in certain parts of Syria and cite false information and statistics that are sourced largely from the armed terrorist groups themselves, particularly the members of the terrorist White Helmets, who are the primary source of information of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). In that connection, my Government finds it deplorable that, despite the existence of a United Nations report on the matter, OHCHR has not yet informed the international community and United Nations Member States of the enormous destruction and abject humanitarian situation of civilians in the beleaguered city of Raqqah caused by the bombardment that was carried out by the so-called "international coalition" and its allied separatist militias. In the same vein, my Government wonders

whether the illegitimate coalition has conducted its operations in and around Raqqah and other cities in accordance with the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution. Has OHCHR documented the crimes and massacres that have been committed in Syria by the illegitimate coalition, certain Western countries and Turkey? Has OHCHR documented the fact that members of the terrorist White Helmets have provided logistical support to ISIL and Nusrah Front terrorists in northern and southern Syria, and that they have fought beside the terrorists?

- The Syrian Arab Republic pays no heed to any terms used by the authors that were proven to be incorrect and politicized, including the redesignation of certain areas of Syria from "besieged" to "hard-to-reach", or some other designation. It also stresses that, pursuant to its constitutional obligations, the principles of international humanitarian law, the relevant United Nations resolutions, in particular Security Council resolution 2253 (2015), and in accordance with humanitarian principles, the Syrian State responds to all Syrians on the basis of need, without discrimination, and continues to press ahead with its efforts to liberate all Syrian territory from terrorists and restore security and stability. Syria reaffirms that all areas liberated by the State from terrorists are now open areas and can be accessed by the United Nations and all other international organizations that truly and sincerely want to provide humanitarian support without discrimination, restrictions or conditions.

The Syrian Arab Republic wishes to correct the phrasing used by the authors: there are still parts of Syria that are under siege by armed terrorist groups, which are besieging civilians from inside cities and preventing them from leaving and denying them humanitarian assistance. This, for example, is currently the case in Idlib.

- The Syrian Arab Republic calls upon the Secretariat, the Security Council and Member States to press Governments and regional entities to put an immediate end to the illegal, unilateral coercive economic measures that they have imposed against Syria, its Government, people, institutions, private sector, businesspeople and service sectors, such as health, education and energy. The continued imposition of those illegal measures is the primary obstacle to securing the basic needs of the Syrian people, enhancing their humanitarian and living conditions, and putting in place the necessary conditions for the return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes and the restoration of normal life. The authors' disregard of that critical issue clearly demonstrates that they are not fully committed to their mandate under the relevant Security Council resolutions, even though they fully recognize the extent to which those coercive measures affect the humanitarian situation and living conditions in Syria.

- In the report under consideration, the authors endeavour to blur mandates and competences by addressing the political situation and by using numerous politicized terms that are unrelated to their mandate or the topic of the report, which is supposed to concern the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic.

- With respect to the authors' statement that the United Nations is not a party to the civilian evacuation agreements, the Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms that there are no civilian evacuation agreements. The United Nations and OCHA should have played an active and vital role in the conclusion of national reconciliation and de-escalation agreements. That is, they should have done so if they truly wished to expose the practices that have been employed against civilians by terrorists during their sieges of populated areas and if they wished to facilitate national reconciliation and regularize the status of armed

individuals, so as to spare Syrian lives, unless the aim of the United Nations is something else.

- The Syrian Arab Republic rejects the authors' clearly politicized approach and unequivocally denies the false allegations that they make with respect to operations conducted by the Syrian State to liberate the south from terrorists. It stresses that those operations were conducted with due regard for humanitarian considerations, in keeping with the concern of the Syrian State for the safety and security of civilians and its desire to ensure that they are protected. The State has provided safe corridors, shelters and basic humanitarian assistance, which paved the way for all subsequent deliveries of international humanitarian support to the south and facilitated the return of civilians to their homes once the areas in which they previously lived had been liberated from the terrorists. Those operations were conducted in keeping with the commitment of the Syrian State to implement Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism, particularly resolution 2253 (2015).

- Although the authors try to sidestep the problem of low levels of international funding for Syria and the issue of donors who, contrary to the claims that they make at their review conferences, are tying their funding pledges to political conditions that are incompatible with the principles of humanitarian work, that does not negate the fact that the irresponsible behaviour of most donors is the real obstacle to strengthening the humanitarian response to the urgent, basic needs of Syrians, especially in those areas that have been liberated from terrorists and to which civilians are returning. Moreover, such politically motivated behaviour is an impediment to the ambitious plans for Syrian refugees to return to their homeland.

- The Syrian Arab Republic affirms that, over the past few months, the cooperation of the Syrian Government with United Nations and international organizations has reached unprecedented levels and helped to enhance the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Syrians in need. That cooperation, whether it be granting entry visas to officials of those organization or facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance to certain areas of the country, is acknowledged by the authors in paragraph 25 of the report. That acknowledgement gives the lie to all accusations that the Syrian State is not facilitating humanitarian work. The Syrian Arab Republic also affirms that the figures on visas are incorrect, as the Syrian authorities have, without exception, processed all visa applications swiftly and in an even-handed manner.

- The Syrian Arab Republic finds it regrettable that the authors have fallen in line with the Governments of certain Western States by shamefully promoting cross-border aid. That method has been proven to be ineffective and does not ensure delivery of aid to civilian beneficiaries. In fact, it has become a method of providing indirect support to the terrorists, who are seizing cross-border aid, and is one of that factors that has enabled terrorists to continue their activities in Syria. Moreover, Syria regrets that, in paragraph 27 of the report, the authors again attempt to burnish the image of the Turkish authorities. They ignore the fact that the Turkish attacks against Afrin were what caused the displacement and humanitarian suffering of thousands of the city's residents.

Based on the above observations, the Syrian Arab Republic reiterates that those who are responsible for drafting Secretariat reports on the humanitarian situation in Syria must change their approach and strive to restore the confidence of the Syrian Government in the United Nations humanitarian system, and OCHA official should adhere to the principles of objectivity, transparency and impartiality.

The Syrian Arab Republic once again calls upon the Security Council to stop issuing these monthly reports, which many see as a waste of time, money and human resources, and replace them with quarterly reports that are written in a professional and credible manner.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2018/785

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 August 2018

Original: English

France: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular resolutions 2423 (2018), 2391 (2017) and 2374 (2017),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali, *emphasizing* that the Malian authorities have primary responsibility for the provision of stability and security throughout the territory of Mali, and *underscoring* the importance of achieving national ownership of peace- and security-related initiatives,

Taking note of the renewed commitment of the Government of Mali, the *Plateforme* coalition of armed groups and the *Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad* coalition of armed groups ("the Plateforme and Coordination armed groups") to the expeditious implementation of all of their remaining obligations under the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali ("the Agreement"), through the adoption of a "*Chronogramme d'actions prioritaires*" during the meeting of the *Comité de Suivi de l'Accord* (CSA) held in Bamako on the 15 and 16 January 2018, followed by the adoption of a Roadmap for its implementation on 22 March 2018 ("the Roadmap"),

Welcoming the recent positive steps achieved in the implementation of the Agreement, while *expressing* its deep frustration that parties have too long stalled the implementation of the Agreement, in spite of significant international support and assistance, *further expressing* a significant sense of impatience with parties over the persistent delays in the full implementation of key provisions of the Agreement and *stressing* the absolute urgency for the Government of Mali and the Plateforme and Coordination armed groups to take unprecedented steps to fully and expeditiously deliver on remaining obligations under the Agreement,

Stressing that all parties to the Agreement share the primary responsibility to make steadfast progress in its implementation,

Recalling the provisions of the Agreement calling upon the Security Council to give its full support to the Agreement, to closely monitor its implementation and, if necessary, to take measures against anyone hindering the implementation of the commitments contained therein or the realisation of its objectives,

Recalling the provisions of resolution 2423 (2018) expressing the intention of the Security Council to follow closely the timely implementation of the Roadmap referred to above and to respond with measures pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017)

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should the parties not implement the agreed-upon commitments within the announced timeframe,

Taking note of the final report (S/2018/581) of the Panel of experts established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) ("the Panel of experts"),

Determining that the situation in Mali continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to renew until 31 August 2019 the measures as set out in paragraphs 1 to 7 of resolution 2374 (2017);

2. *Reaffirms* that these measures shall apply to individuals and entities as designated by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 ("the Committee"), as set forth in paragraphs 8 and 9 of resolution 2374 (2017);

3. *Decides* to extend until 30 September 2019 the mandate of the Panel of experts, as set out in paragraphs 11 to 15 of resolution 2374 (2017), as well as the request to MINUSMA, as set out in paragraph 16 of resolution 2374 (2017), *expresses* its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding its further extension no later than 31 August 2019, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the Panel of experts, in consultation with the Committee, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the current members of the Panel of experts;

4. *Requests* the Panel of experts to provide to the Council, after discussion with the Committee, a midterm report no later than 28 February 2019, a final report no later than 15 August 2019, and periodic updates in between, as appropriate;

5. *Reaffirms* the reporting and review provisions as set out in resolution 2374 (2017);

6. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2018/786

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 August 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 24 August 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to the request of the Security Council in paragraph 61 of its resolution 2409 (2018), I have the honour to submit the 30-day update covering the period from 26 July to 24 August 2018 on political and technical progress towards the holding of elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 23 December 2018 and obstacles to the implementation of the 31 December 2016 political agreement (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

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Annex

Update of the Secretary-General on progress in the electoral process and implementation of the 31 December 2016 political agreement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 24 August 2018

1. The present update, which covers developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 26 July to 24 August 2018, is submitted pursuant to resolution 2409 (2018), in which the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to provide a written update every 30 days on political and technical progress towards the holding of elections in the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 23 December 2018 and on obstacles to the implementation of the 31 December 2016 political agreement.

I. Key political developments related to the electoral process and implementation of the political agreement

2. The Independent National Electoral Commission continued to take key steps towards the holding of the presidential and national and provincial legislative elections on 23 December. On 27 July, the Commission published the provisional list of candidates for the provincial elections, which comprises 19,788 candidates, of whom 88.2 per cent are men and 11.8 per cent are women. As at 9 August, 3,179 candidates, of whom 89.6 per cent are men and 10.4 per cent are women, had registered for the national legislative elections. On 24 August, the Commission published the provisional list of presidential candidates, declaring inadmissible 6 candidacies out of 25 for reasons such as conviction on corruption charges, dual citizenship, conflict of interest, procedural errors in the registration process and lack of proof of payment of registration fees. The leader of the Mouvement de libération du Congo opposition party, Jean-Pierre Bemba, was declared ineligible on the grounds that he had been sentenced, in March 2017, by the International Criminal Court to one year in prison and a fine of 300,000 euros for witness tampering. Former Prime Ministers Adolphe Muzito, Antoine Gizenga and Samy Badibanga were also declared ineligible on the grounds of conflict of interest, procedural error and dual citizenship, respectively. Opposition parties rejected the decision, arguing that it was politically motivated, and stated that they would appeal it before the Constitutional Court. The Minister of Communications and Government Spokesperson, Lambert Mende, rejected the opposition's allegations and noted that all political actors should submit to the legal requirements of eligibility. The Commission published, on the same date, the provisional list of 15,222 eligible candidates from a total of 15,505 candidates for the national legislative elections.

3. On 1 August, 25 governors and 1 acting governor signed the charter of the Front commun pour le Congo, a platform for which the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Joseph Kabila, serves as the "moral authority". A wide array of political, civil society and religious leaders in the Democratic Republic of the Congo participated in the signing ceremony.

4. Also on 1 August, Jean-Pierre Bemba returned to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and was welcomed by thousands of supporters in Kinshasa. On 2 August, he submitted his candidacy for the presidential elections at the headquarters of the Independent National Electoral Commission in Kinshasa. At a press conference held on 3 August, Mr. Bemba called for inclusive, transparent and democratic elections. He also appealed to the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to find a solution that would allow the leader of the Ensemble pour le changement opposition

platform, Moïse Katumbi, to take part in the presidential elections. On 5 August, Mr. Bemba left the Democratic Republic of the Congo for Brussels after visiting his electoral stronghold of Gemena, in Sud-Ubangi. The national police provided security to Mr. Bemba and his family. No incidents occurred upon his return.

5. From 6 to 8 August, other opposition leaders registered as presidential candidates. Of note are: Félix Tshisekedi, the leader of the Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social; Freddy Matungulu of Congo Na Biso; Martin Fayulu of the Engagement pour la citoyenneté et le développement; Tryphon Kin-Kiey Mulumba, a former member of the Majorité présidentielle; and Vital Kamerhe, the leader of the Union pour la nation congolaise. Former Prime Ministers Adolphe Muzito of the Nouvel élan, Antoine Gizenga of the Parti lumumbiste unifié, allied with the Majorité présidentielle, and Samy Badibanga of the Progressistes also submitted their candidacies.

6. Moïse Katumbi was unsuccessful in his attempts to return to the Democratic Republic of the Congo through Lubumbashi, Haut-Katanga, on 3 and 4 August. Against the backdrop of media reports that the Government authorities had refused to grant landing rights to Mr. Katumbi's aeroplane at Lubumbashi airport, he was allegedly not permitted to cross into the Democratic Republic of the Congo from Zambia through the Kasumbalesa border post. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo claimed that Mr. Katumbi had not presented himself at the border crossing and refuted claims that he had attempted to land in Lubumbashi. Demonstrations ensued in Kasumbalesa and Lubumbashi between 3 and 6 August, during which one woman, a 15-year-old boy and a 10-year-old boy were reportedly killed by bullets fired by national police elements, while three other persons were wounded by live ammunition. A total of 89 persons were arrested, of whom 55 persons, including 1 minor, were arrested during a police operation in Kasumbalesa on 5 August and 34 persons, including 2 minors, were arrested during demonstrations in Lubumbashi on 6 August. At the time of reporting, 21 of those persons had been released, including 3 minors who had been transferred to a juvenile court. The other 68 persons had appeared before the Tribunal de grande instance of Lubumbashi and were being held at the Kasapa prison on charges including destruction of property, robbery, contempt of authority and rebellion against the State.

7. On 6 August, the Conférence épiscopale nationale du Congo issued a communiqué in which it called upon the Government to allow Moïse Katumbi to return and submit his candidacy. On 10 August, the Secretary-General of the Ensemble pour le changement political platform, Delly Sesanga, announced that the platform had submitted requests to the Conseil d'Etat that Mr. Katumbi be allowed to enter and move around freely in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and that measures be taken to allow him to register as a presidential candidate.

8. On 8 August, the Front commun pour le Congo platform nominated the Permanent Secretary of the ruling Parti du peuple pour la reconstruction et la démocratie and former Vice Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary, as its presidential candidate. The designation of Mr. Ramazani Shadary was broadly welcomed across the political spectrum as a positive development that puts an end to speculation and uncertainty regarding the commitment of President Kabila to respect the Constitution. On 9 August, in a joint statement, Canada, Switzerland, the United States of America, the African Union, the European Union and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) welcomed the decision of the President to respect the Constitution, stating that this constituted a key milestone towards the first peaceful transfer of power in the country's history. On the same day, the Comité laïc de coordination issued a statement in which it announced that it had

cancelled the protest marches that it had planned for 12 to 14 August in the event that President Kabila decided to run again for office.

9. Several key political actors, including Adolphe Muzito, Félix Tshisekedi, Freddy Matungulu, Jean-Pierre Bemba and Vital Kamerhe advocated a single opposition presidential candidate. In that regard, on 9 August, in Kinshasa, Mr. Tshisekedi, the Secretary-General of the Mouvement de libération du Congo, Eve Bazaïba, and Mr. Kamerhe met to exchange views on the issue of a single opposition presidential candidate.

10. On 13 August, opposition leaders Félix Tshisekedi, Freddy Matungulu, Jean-Pierre Bemba, Martin Fayulu, Moïse Katumbi and Vital Kamerhe issued a joint communiqué in which they noted that the decision of President Kabila to abide by the Constitution should not detract the attention of the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the international community from ensuring that the 23 December elections meet basic democratic norms. They condemned the actions by the Government to hinder the efforts of Mr. Katumbi to return to the country and register as a presidential candidate, called upon the Government to fully implement the confidence-building measures envisaged by the 31 December 2016 political agreement by releasing political prisoners and detainees, and urged the Independent National Electoral Commission to stop the use of the voting machines and remove some 10 million alleged fraudulent voters from the electoral register. They also stated that consultations had been held to agree upon a common political agenda and nominate a single opposition candidate.

11. On 14 August, the spokesperson of the Majorité présidentielle, André-Alain Atundu, held a press conference during which he lauded the designation of Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary as the presidential candidate of the Front commun pour le Congo, indicating that this signalled the beginning of a long and necessary march towards the democratic conquest of power in conformity with the strategic plan of the moral authority of the Front commun. In the same vein, on 16 August, the Strategic Committee of the Front commun held a press conference during which the Chief of Staff of President Kabila, Néhémie Mwilanya, reiterated the Government's decision to assume responsibility for the logistics and materials required for organizing the forthcoming elections. Highlighting the principle of respect for national sovereignty, he noted that the Democratic Republic of the Congo expected only political and diplomatic support from the international community. At the same event, the Minister of Justice, Alexis Thambwe Mwamba, stated that Moïse Katumbi was a "fugitive and must be arrested" and that an international arrest warrant had been issued to that effect. He observed that, contrary to media reports, Mr. Katumbi had never attempted to present himself to national security forces at the Kasumbalesa border post, who stood ready to carry out his arrest. On 2 August, the counsel for the prosecution, Joseph Nsabua, had issued a communiqué in which he stated that Mr. Katumbi would be put under immediate arrest upon his return to the Democratic Republic of the Congo as he had failed, when his temporary authorization to seek medical treatment abroad had expired, to appear before a magistrates' court to face charges of attempts against the security of the State.

12. At the regional level, on 30 July, the Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States and the Economic Community of Central African States held a joint summit on peace, security, stability and the fight against terrorism and violent extremism in Lomé. In a communiqué, they called upon stakeholders in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to respect the 31 December 2016 political agreement as it remains the only viable path to credible elections in the country. They also lauded the efforts of the Government to implement the electoral process in accordance with the timetable laid out by the Independent National Electoral Commission.

13. On 6 August, the African Union Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, stressed the need for all stakeholders to ensure the holding of peaceful, transparent and inclusive elections, as well as the implementation of appropriate confidence-building measures to create an environment conducive to a level playing field. On the same date, the European Union issued a declaration in which it echoed the communiqué of the African Union on the electoral process, recalling the importance of commitments undertaken by all parties to respect the 31 December 2016 political agreement, including the implementation of confidence-building measures.

14. On 14 August, the President of Angola, João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço, in his capacity as Chair of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), convened a summit in Luanda to review the political and security situation in the Central African, Great Lakes and Southern African regions. In the final communiqué of the summit, the Heads of State commended President Kabila for abiding by his commitment to fully respect the Constitution, thereby clearly demonstrating his determination to place the interests of the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo above any other considerations. They also expressed their readiness to support the Democratic Republic of the Congo at a critical moment in the consolidation of its democratic process.

15. On 17 and 18 August, President Kabila took part in the thirty-ninth summit of SADC in Windhoek. In the final communiqué of the summit, SADC commended the President and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo for upholding the Constitution and took note of the decision of the Government to provide the funding and logistics necessary for the holding of peaceful and credible elections.

16. With respect to relations between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and regional actors, on 29 July, in Kigali, the Vice Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Léonard She Okitundu, delivered to the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, a message from President Kabila relating to political and security issues. On 2 August, in Luanda, President Kabila met President Lourenço to discuss bilateral cooperation between Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the situation in Central Africa and the Great Lakes region. In the communiqué issued at the end of the meeting, the Presidents reiterated, inter alia, their commitment to the principles of non-interference in the domestic affairs of States and respect for national sovereignty and welcomed the progress made in preparations for the holding of elections on 23 December. On 10 August, the President of South Africa, Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa, arrived in Kinshasa, where he met President Kabila to discuss the political, electoral and security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, issues of common interest in the region and bilateral cooperation between the two countries. In the communiqué issued after the meeting, the noteworthy progress made by the national authorities in preparations for the 23 December elections and the funding of the electoral process by the Government were highlighted, among other things.

II. Key electoral developments related to the implementation of the political agreement

A. Electoral developments

17. On 28 July, MONUSCO, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) and the Projet d'appui au cycle électoral au Congo, managed by the United Nations Development Programme, organized a

two-day training workshop in Lubumbashi for female candidates, who were introduced to election-specific mechanisms such as electoral observation. On 31 July, MONUSCO organized an awareness-raising session on elections with the participation of 50 persons (32 men and 18 women), including students and members of civil society organizations.

18. On 8 August, in accordance with the electoral calendar, the Independent National Electoral Commission officially closed the 172 candidate registration offices processing presidential and national legislative candidacies. However, processing continued until 13 August for additions, modifications or withdrawals relative to candidates and the documentation submitted by them. Candidates in possession of completed files when the registration offices closed on 8 August were accorded 48 hours to finalize the registration process.

19. Since the original request was received from the Independent National Electoral Commission for MONUSCO to provide logistical support, on the basis of which the Mission submitted its proposed plan on 30 November 2017, recent public statements by officials of the Government and the Commission have indicated that the Commission intends to hold the elections without support from external partners. The efforts of MONUSCO have been geared primarily towards establishing a capacity that could be used if required. To ensure its readiness, the Mission had contracted 24 air assets to provide support to the first phase of the electoral process. In the meantime, MONUSCO intends to utilize these assets to support its internal operations as well as the Ministry of Health, the World Health Organization and other partners in the response against the Ebola outbreak in the Beni area, in North Kivu.

20. On 14 August, at a press conference in Kinshasa, the President of the Independent National Electoral Commission, Corneille Nangaa, stated that the Commission was acquiring 7 helicopters, 7 aeroplanes, 130 trucks and 191 pickup vehicles for electoral logistics. He noted that every effort would be made to ensure that elections take place on 23 December.

B. Restrictions on political space and violence related to the implementation of the political agreement in the electoral context

21. On 26 July, in Kinshasa, the leader of the Mouvement lumumbiste progressiste party, Franck Diongo, who is currently detained at the Makala prison, was denied permission to go to the registration office of the Independent National Electoral Commission to submit his candidacy for the national legislative elections. The Attorney General stated that he was not responsible for managing Mr. Diongo's detention and was therefore not able to order the prison authorities to escort him to the Commission. It should be recalled that, in a letter to the Commission dated 31 October 2017, the Minister of Justice had stated that the offence for which Mr. Diongo had been sentenced did not entail the deprivation of his political rights. However, no appropriate action was taken to uphold his rights.

22. On 30 July, in Kinshasa, 40 people, including 5 women, were arrested by the national police during a peaceful march organized by the Engagement citoyen pour le changement citizens' movement to submit to the office of the Personal Representative of the President on Sexual Violence and Child Recruitment a letter denouncing sexual violence against minors in several provinces. They were all released the following day.

C. Confidence-building measures

23. On 27 July, in a meeting with the Director of the United Nations Joint Human Rights Office, the Minister of Justice reiterated that he was not willing to act on cases of political prisoners sentenced for civil offences, such as Jean-Claude Muyambo (sentenced for real estate fraud), Eugène Diomi Ndongala (sentenced for rape) and Franck Diongo (sentenced for sequestration), although two of them (Muyambo and Diomi Ndongala) are expressly mentioned in the 31 December 2016 political agreement. Nevertheless, the Minister agreed to find solutions in terms of conditional release or presidential pardon for emblematic cases, including the cases of Gérard Mulumba, whose health is reportedly deteriorating, as well as Firmin Yangambi and Eric Kikunda, who have already spent nine years in prison and have not benefited from the presidential pardon of 2014.

III. Good offices efforts for the implementation of the political agreement

24. As part of her efforts to foster a credible and inclusive electoral process, my Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo met the Vice Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs on 3 and 15 August and raised, inter alia, the cases of Jean-Pierre Bemba and Moïse Katumbi. She also met the Secretary-General of the Mouvement de libération du Congo, the Secretary-General of the Ensemble pour le changement and the team of lawyers representing Mr. Katumbi on 2 August, as well as Vital Kamerhe on 14 August to discuss the electoral process.

IV. Observations

25. I welcome the encouraging developments in the ongoing political and electoral process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The political developments witnessed over the past weeks show the determination of actors across the political divide to ensure that democratic practices are consolidated in the country. I especially wish to recognize the continued public commitment of President Kabila to the organization of the elections at the end of 2018 in conformity with the Constitution, which will lead to the first democratic transfer of power in the country. The steady progress made by the Independent National Electoral Commission in meeting the critical deadlines in the electoral calendar is another encouraging step in the right direction. I also take note of the Commission's efforts to remain in continued dialogue with political actors on the various contentious issues in the electoral process.

26. I call upon the Government, opposition parties and civil society to use this momentum to ensure that the 23 December elections are held in a peaceful and transparent environment. It is of paramount importance that all stakeholders in the Democratic Republic of the Congo adopt a constructive approach in pursuit of solutions to outstanding contentious electoral matters, including the use of voting machines and the voter register. The Constitution and the 31 December 2016 political agreement remain the main frameworks for finding peaceful, democratic and durable solutions to the challenges facing the electoral process.

27. With respect to the support of MONUSCO to the electoral process, it would be important that the Independent National Electoral Commission provide the necessary details that would enable timely and effective assistance from the Mission. I wish to note that the United Nations, while respecting the decision of the Government to fully fund the electoral process, stands ready to provide the logistical and technical assistance that MONUSCO has been mandated to carry out. Moreover, I call upon the

Government to continue to provide to the Commission regular and adequate disbursements of funds to enable smooth and timely preparations for the elections.

28. I am also encouraged by the active involvement of regional actors in supporting the political and electoral process. The role of regional actors in consolidating the progress made in stabilizing the Democratic Republic of the Congo over the past decade cannot be overemphasized. I appeal to regional actors, working in collaboration with international partners, to continue to pursue initiatives aimed at creating the conditions for peaceful, credible and transparent elections and to remain engaged in the post-electoral period. Furthermore, I note the continued diplomatic efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to strengthen bilateral cooperation with key regional actors. My Special Representative for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and my Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region will continue to provide their good offices and support to national, regional and international initiatives aimed at promoting peaceful solutions to the challenges facing the political and electoral process.

29. I remain, however, concerned by continued reports of repression and intimidation of political activists and human rights defenders and other restrictions on the political space. I call upon the national authorities to lift the general ban on public demonstrations and uphold the rights of citizens to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. Equally important is the need for progress on implementing the confidence-building measures set out in the 31 December 2016 political agreement. I urge the Government to explore various avenues that would lead to the effective and swift implementation of the confidence-building measures. Strong political gestures could be envisaged, in lieu of legalistic approaches, in the interests of dialogue and peace. The release of all political prisoners and prisoners of opinion would be a positive development in this regard. Upholding the fundamental rights and freedoms of all citizens and implementing fully and swiftly the confidence-building measures will help to defuse political tensions and create a level playing field in the lead-up to the elections.

United Nations S/2018/787

Security Council

Distr.: General
6 September 2018
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 28 August 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I transmit to you herewith the statement regarding the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016), 2393 (2017) and 2401 (2018) (S/2018/707), which concern the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, that I was to deliver at the 8332nd meeting of the Security Council, which was convened on 28 August 2018 to consider the item on the situation in the Middle East.

I should like to thank the President of the Security Council for referring to the two letters that we addressed to the President and the members of the Council regarding the question of chemical weapons (S/2018/630) and the serious threat posed by the possibility that such weapons might be used again in Idlib. In response to the questions that were posed to me by the President, I should like to note that are many important points that need to be clarified.

To begin, I should like to draw attention to the following:

- As the report of Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was being written, the Syrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates approved 2,700 requests from the World Food Programme (WFP) to deliver assistance to liberated and other areas. That is to say, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has approved all the 2,700 requests that WFP submitted.

- In August, we circulated a detailed explanation of the meaning and purpose of Act No. 10 to the members of the Security Council and Member States, thereby putting the lie to all the malicious falsehoods and misinformation that are being circulated periodically regarding the aims of the Act. This matter should therefore no longer be a topic of discussion.

- The Syrian Arab Red Crescent continues to work, every day, with its local and international humanitarian partners to deliver assistance. Dozens of convoys have reached areas where the inhabitants need such assistance. Our problem with OCHA is that Mr. John Ging, Director of its Division for Operations and Advocacy, has said that only four convoys were approved. That is incorrect. The problem is that OCHA only counts those convoys in which it takes part. For example, they do not take into account WFP, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or Red Cross convoys. That is why OCHA does not count or mention in its reports the hundreds, indeed thousands, of tons of aid that is sent to areas where the population needs assistance. That is why OCHA

only mentions four convoys in this month's report. That is not only incorrect, but also misleads the members of the Security Council.

We have warned many times about the presence of a huge, unruly elephant in this chamber that threatens the foundations of our joint efforts and tramples under its huge feet many facts, in order to cover up the reality that certain permanent members of the Council are violating the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

It also appears that the governments of certain Western States are adamant about pursuing their misguided polices towards my country. Instead of admitting guilt and taking political and legal responsibility for waging a terrorist war against the Syrian State and people, and instead of correcting the disastrous policies that they have pursued with regard to our region, in general, and with regard to my country, in particular, those Governments continue to commit acts of aggression with their black banners, White Helmets and red lines. They are currently preparing to stage another bloody incident by using chemical weapons in north-western Syria. Their aim is to impede the ongoing political process and justify aggression by Western countries that are Council members against my country, with a view to occupying parts of it and boosting the morale and determination of what remains of the terrorist groups in those areas.

My Government condemns and rejects both the form and substance of the statement that the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom issued a few days ago. Syria has repeatedly underscored that it considers the use of chemical weapons to be immoral, and condemns their use anywhere, under any circumstances and against whomsoever. Syria once again reiterates that it does not possess any chemical weapons. It has fulfilled all its obligations towards the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which has informed international bodies, including the Security Council, that Syria has fulfilled its obligations in that regard. There is no need for reiterate, at every meeting, that the Syrian chemical-weapon stockpile was destroyed on the United States vessel *MV Cape Ray* in the Mediterranean Sea. Meanwhile, we await the approval of the Council for Israeli stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons to be destroyed.

I should now like to put to you documented information regarding the preparations that are being made by the terrorists of the Nusrah Front and affiliated groups to use chemical weapons against civilians in Idlib governorate, with a view to accusing Syrian forces and justifying any military aggression by the Governments of the States that control those terrorist groups. That is what happened during the American attack against the Sha'irat airbase on 7 April 2017 and the tripartite American-British-French aggression that occurred on 14 April 2018.

We strongly call upon those States that have influence over the terrorists to prevent their agents from committing this crime. In that connection, it should be noted that eight containers of chlorine were transferred to the village of Halluz, Idlib governorate, in preparation for the execution of a new, staged chemical attack in which Turkistan Islamic Party and Nusrah Front terrorists, whom the authors of the Secretariat report see fit to designate as the "non-State armed opposition", will use toxic chemicals against civilians, including dozens of children, who were abducted a few days ago from the countryside of Aleppo and Idlib, and then accuse the Syrian Government in order to incite an attack against it.

Any aggression against my country that might occur would be an act of aggression against a founding Member of the United Nations, and an attack on regional and international peace and security. It would also amount to support for terrorism and an attack against the efforts that we are making with our allies to counter terrorism. The aggressors should, of course, be aware that what goes around comes around.

My Government regrets that the authors of the Secretariat reports continue to take a negative and politicized approach that is biased and unprofessional. For example, the fifty-fourth report contains no reference at all to the serious violation of the separation of forces agreement that occurred recently in the occupied Syrian Golan. My Government sees no reason for the Secretariat and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to ignore the involvement of Israel in the operation to evacuate and smuggle White Helmet terrorists across the line of separation in the occupied Syrian Golan to Jordan, and then on to the capitals of the Western States that support those terrorists. My Government also sees no reason to ignore the fact that the Turkish Government is supporting the terrorists of the White Helmets, the Turkistan Islamic Party, the Nusrah Front and the Levant Liberation Organization, as well Uighur and Uzbek terrorists and other "moderates", nor the fact that the Turkish Government is directly facilitating their activities in Syria.

My Government condemns and rejects any passage in the report commending Turkey for providing aid to the city of Afrin and other areas. It also reminds everyone that the Turkish military aggression against the cities of Afrin, Jarabulus, Bab and Ayn al-Arab, as well as other parts of Syria, directly caused the displacement and suffering of hundreds of thousands of civilians. In fact, the Turkish military presence is an occupation that must end, and it is meant to support the terrorism perpetrated by the armed terrorist groups that are present in those areas.

My Government pays no heed to any politicized terms used by the authors, including the redesignation of certain areas of Syria from "besieged" to "hard-to-reach", or some other designation. It should like to reaffirm that it responds to all Syrians, in keeping with its national role and its aim of meeting the needs of all Syrians without discrimination. I should also like to reaffirm that all the areas liberated by the Syrian State from terrorists are now open areas and can be reached by the United Nations and humanitarian partners that truly and sincerely want to provide humanitarian support to Syrians without discrimination, restrictions or conditions The Syrian Arab Republic wishes to correct the phrasing used by the authors: there are still parts of Syria that are under siege by armed terrorist groups, which are besieging civilians from inside cities and preventing them from leaving and denying them humanitarian assistance. This, for example, is currently the case in Idlib, where millions of civilians are besieged from within.

My Government has drawn attention, and I have drawn the attention of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mr. Mark Lowcock, from the time that he assumed his post, to the pressing need to address the repercussions of the unilateral coercive economic measures that the Governments of certain States have imposed on the Syrian people. Quite simply and frankly, we have yet to find a justification for the introduction of military and political issues into a monthly report on the humanitarian situation. The pretext given is that those issues are within the scope of the relevant Security Council resolutions. Meanwhile, no mention is made of the serious adverse effects of the illegal economic blockade imposed on Syria, a blockade that directly affects the activities of the United Nations and efforts to meet the basic needs of Syrians.

I call upon the Secretariat and Mr. Lowcock to work earnestly with the Syrian Government, with a view to starting a new and constructive phase of humanitarian work in Syria. Doing so would help start the reconstruction process and give impetus to development and recovery efforts, free from American-Western extortion. I will say this frankly: the time has come for the Secretariat to disassociate itself from the "secret document" that sets out the vision and recommendations of the former Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, regarding the guidelines for humanitarian work in Syria, and from the outcomes of the Brussels conference, which tied contributions made for reconstruction and development to political conditions

that are contrary to the true principles of humanitarian work and that run counter to the "leave no one behind" principle that governs development work.

Finally, in response to the recommendations of the Secretary-General, I should like to assure him and all of you that we are serious about following through on a political process that is led by Syrians alone, without external interference. We are furthermore determined to restore security and stability, preserve the sovereignty and independence of the Syrian Arab Republic and its territorial unity and integrity, and ensure that all refugees and displaced Syrians can return to their homes in dignity and safety. To that end, the Syrian Commission for Coordinating the Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons was recently established, in order to take the necessary measures in that regard.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2018/788

Security Council

Distr.: General
5 September 2018
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 28 August 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I refer to the letter dated 16 July 2018 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/705). That letter transmits the twenty-second report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions 1526 (2004) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities.

On instructions from my Government, allow me to convey the following national comments and reservations concerning some of the contents of the report. I hope that you will engage with those points and take them into consideration. The Syrian Arab Republic writes in its capacity as a concerned State that is at the forefront of efforts to confront terrorism and the threat posed by the two terrorist organizations and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. Indeed, paragraph 1 of the report acknowledges that the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has been genuinely combating Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and has been directly successful in weakening and pushing back ISIL with a view to its eradication.

- My Government has examined the contents of the report with interest. It is pleased to note that the reference to the so-called Islamic military coalition against terrorism has been removed, as has the reference to the purported efforts of the Turkish Government aimed at denying ISIL access to the financial system as well as its generation of funds and to disrupt the movement of foreign terrorist fighters and funds through middlemen or facilitators.

You will recall that such statements appeared in the Team's twenty-first report, and that my Government protested against the inclusion of that information, which is mistaken and inconsistent with the facts. The build-up of events of the last few years has shown that the Governments of Turkey and of certain States members of the so-called Islamic coalition, alongside some other Governments, have supported, funded, armed and facilitated the movement and infiltration of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq. They have also provided funds, weapons and assistance to the terrorist organizations ISIL and Al-Qaida in Syria. Those Governments therefore bear direct and indirect responsibility for the emergence and spread of the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters. As a result of such practices, thousands of innocent civilians have been killed, infrastructure and public and private property have been destroyed, the resources and economy of the Syrian Arab Republic have sustained extensive damage, and international peace and security have come under attack.

- The Syrian Government objected that those statements contradicted the facts. It did so because of its responsibility as a founding member of the United Nations

and as a State directly concerned by the subject matter of the Team's reports, particularly given that the relevant Security Council resolutions guarantee that the Team's methods and work should be characterized by independence, professionalism and impartiality.

- By the same token, the Syrian Government rejects the baseless claims made in the summary and in paragraphs 10 and 19 of the report, according to which leaders of the Al-Qaida terrorist group in the Islamic Republic of Iran were able to influence disputes among the fighters in Idlib, in the Syrian Arab Republic. My Government objects to the inclusion of such information, which undermines the credibility of a United Nations report that is supposed to be independent, transparent and free from any politicized tendencies or purposes. My Government has identified some overlap between the mistaken claims made in the present report and the statements made by a certain permanent member of the Security Council that has used its position to carry out a shabby political attack on the Islamic Republic of Iran by citing baseless information. The confirmed facts leave no doubt that Al-Qaida was born because a number of well-known Governments and intelligence services exploited *jihadist*, *takfirist* and Wahhabi ideologies to attract thousands of Muslim youths and recruit them into terrorist movements. Everybody knows that the Iranian Government has from the very outset fought against Al-Qaida's beliefs and practices, which are based on spreading death and destruction and sowing the seeds of sectarianism among Muslims.

- The Syrian Government requests that the statements made in the summary and in paragraphs 10 and 19 of the report be deleted, failing which it will be compelled to object to the inclusion of any reference to the Team's twenty-second report in any future draft resolution or United Nations report.

- According to the summary and core text of the report, ISIL, having been defeated militarily in Iraq and most of the Syrian Arab Republic during 2017, rallied in early 2018 owing to a loss of momentum by forces fighting it in the east of the Syrian Arab Republic. Paragraph 1 states as follows: "Nevertheless, ISIL showed greater resilience in the east of the Syrian Arab Republic, and even slightly recovered the initiative. Several Member States attributed this to a reduced contribution by the mainly Kurdish People's Protection Units contingent of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to the campaign in the east in early 2018. As the Syrian Democratic Forces increased its military activity once more, the momentum of the fighting appeared to be turning against ISIL again by June 2018".

My Government emphasizes that the militias of the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces and Kurdish People's Protection Units are illegal armed forces that act outside the framework of the Syrian State. Their activities therefore violate the Constitution and the law and endanger the safety and sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic. The armed militias are associated with hostile American occupation forces and with all forces that cooperate with them as part of the so-called international coalition, which was formed outside the framework of international legality and without a resolution of the Security Council. The illegal armed militias operate at the behest of the hostile American forces, alongside which they have worked to facilitate the exit of ISIL terrorists and their families from Raqqah, along with their medium and heavy weapons, following suspicious deals with the leaders of the terrorist organization.

In its account of the activities of the illegal armed militias, the Team refers to a loss of momentum by forces fighting ISIL. Such was in fact part of the allotted role of those and other militias. The aim was to achieve certain political and military goals, particularly to pave the way and provide the means for the terrorist organization to

recover its power and its operational capacity to confront the Syrian Arab Army and its allies. The same is true of the suspicious role of the American base in Tanf, and of what has happened in the Rukban camp with the knowledge and assistance of the American occupying forces, which surround the camp and control its supply lines. The most recent ISIL attack on Suwayda' governorate is a direct, glaring sign that the so-called international coalition and its associated illegal armed militias are not serious about fighting terrorism. Instead, they have used counter-terrorism as a pretext to achieve political and military goals that threaten the sovereignty and independence of Syria. If this perilous situation is not addressed, it will have a direct impact on regional and international peace and security.

- As regards funding for the Nusrah Front (QDe.137), the Syrian Arab Republic disagrees with the Team's assessment in paragraph 22 of the current report. The evidence for the Nusrah Front's true sources of funding remains unclear and indirect. The authors of the report continue to believe that most of the funding is domestic, and they refer to foreign funding only in an implicit and timid manner. My Government remains firmly convinced that the terrorist Nusrah Front is still receiving direct financial support from the Governments of certain States, foremost among which are Qatar and Turkey. It also receives vast sums from charities and cash collections in numerous countries, particularly in the Gulf region. Moreover, hundreds of so-called charitable associations and civil society organizations located in the areas controlled by the Nusrah Front are masquerading as humanitarian organizations while they are in fact affiliated with the group. Those entities receive funds from abroad, especially through donations and other financing that are indulged, facilitated or simply ignored by the Governments of the countries in question.

- My Government notes with interest that the report states, both implicitly and explicitly, that the terrorist Nusrah Front is no less dangerous than the terrorist organization ISIL. That recognition is belated, even though the Syrian Arab Republic has persistently warned the United Nations and its counter-terrorism agencies and committees that the terrorist organization Nusrah Front has the human, financial and military means to survive and continue perpetrating terrorist acts, more so than the terrorist organization ISIL. Once again, my Government invites the Team to focus in the coming period on the genuine threat posed by the presence of the terrorist organization Nusrah Front and on its strategic and ideological ties and connections with various armed terrorist groups in Syria, groups whose decisions and activities it can even direct or control.

- In that connection, my Government invites the Team to attach particular importance to the activities of a specific and dangerous category of foreign terrorist fighters that is still on Syrian soil, namely the Turkestani and Uighur terrorist fighters within the ranks of the terrorist Nusrah Front and other associated armed terrorist organizations, such as the Turkistan Islamic Party. Lastly, the Syrian Government calls on the Team to examine the question of the involvement of the Governments of certain Member States, particularly the Turkish Government, in supporting and facilitating the activities of those foreign terrorist fighters in Syria.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2018/789

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 August 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 24 August 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to my report on the activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), covering the period from 15 November 2017 to 15 May 2018 (S/2018/521), and to your related statement, as President of the Security Council, on 10 August 2018 (S/PRST/2018/17).

In the aforementioned report, I noted that a key priority of UNOCA in its next mandate would be to work with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and its member States towards laying the groundwork for the structural prevention of election-related violence.

I also noted that the complex nature of ongoing conflicts in the subregion, the emergence of new threats to peace and security and outstanding challenges required sustained and more coordinated and coherent support from the United Nations and the international community. As ECCAS and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) pursued their efforts to implement institutional reforms, mobilizing the necessary political and technical support should remain a major priority. The convening of regular tripartite meetings between UNOCA, ECCAS and CEMAC would be a useful tool in that process.

In addition, I noted that the growing transregional threats also necessitated strengthened cooperation between ECCAS and the Economic Community of West African States and between UNOCA and the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS).

In the light of the above, I recommend that the mandate of UNOCA be extended for a period of three years, from 1 September 2018 to 31 August 2021.

I also submit herewith the draft mandate of UNOCA for the period 2018–2021, in which the four core objectives of UNOCA are described (see annex). The objectives are to be pursued in close collaboration with ECCAS, CEMAC, the Gulf of Guinea Commission, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and other relevant regional and subregional partners.

UNOCA will continue to work in close collaboration with UNOWAS on issues related to maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, as well as on the impact of the activities of Boko Haram on countries of the Lake Chad Basin region. In line with the policy of the United Nations, UNOCA will ensure that gender and human rights are mainstreamed into its activities.

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I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

Annex

Draft mandate of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa for the period 2018–2021

The objectives below are to be pursued by the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), in close collaboration with relevant subregional and regional partners.

Objective 1. Monitor political developments in Central Africa, carry out good offices and special assignments on behalf of the Secretary-General and enhance subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation in countries of the subregion, with due attention to human rights and gender dimensions:

(a) Perform good offices on behalf of the Secretary-General, including in countries facing electoral or institutional crises;

(b) Enhance the capacity for conflict prevention, mediation and peace consolidation of subregional actors, including the Economic Community of Central African States;

(c) Serve as secretariat for the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa and assist States in implementing the recommendations of the Committee, in accordance with relevant General Assembly resolutions.

Objective 2. Support United Nations efforts in the subregion as well as regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security, including from human rights and gender perspectives:

(a) Promote and support, as appropriate, regional and subregional efforts to address the impact of emerging security threats, including Boko Haram, maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and other cross-border threats, such as issues related to transhumance, as well as the regional dimension of security crises in some States of the subregion;

(b) Support the African Union-led African Initiative for Peace and Reconciliation in the Central African Republic;

(c) Coordinate the implementation of the United Nations regional strategy to address the threat and impact of the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army (S/2012/481), in close collaboration with the African Union and relevant partners;

(d) Cooperate with subregional organizations, in particular the Economic Community of Central African States, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, the Gulf of Guinea Commission, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and other key partners and assist them, as appropriate, in their promotion of peace and stability in the broader Central African subregion and in the strengthening of their capacities.

Objective 3. Enhance coherence and coordination in the work of the United Nations in the subregion on peace and security:

(a) Increase internal United Nations exchanges, collaboration and joint initiatives within the subregion;

(b) Advocate the priorities identified by United Nations entities in the subregion.

Objective 4. Advise the Secretary-General and United Nations entities in the region on significant developments in Central Africa:

(a) Undertake regular analysis of, and reports on, the situation in the countries of the subregion and regional trends;

(b) Establish a dedicated analytical unit integrated under the Political Affairs Section.

18-14257

United Nations S/2018/790

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 August 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 28 August 2018 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 24 August 2018 (S/2018/789) concerning your recommendation to extend the mandate of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa for a period of three years, from 1 September 2018 to 31 August 2021, has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the information contained in your letter and the recommendation expressed therein.

(*Signed*) Karen **Pierce**
President of the Security Council

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United Nations S/2018/791

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 August 2018

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on the progress made with regard to the stabilization and restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau

I. Introduction

1. The present report, submitted pursuant to paragraph 28 of Security Council resolution 2404 (2018), is my fourth report on the progress made by Guinea-Bissau with regard to the stabilization and restoration of constitutional order in the country. It provides an update on relevant developments since my previous report, of 23 August 2017 (S/2017/715), and includes recommendations on the continuation of the sanctions regime, pursuant to Council resolution 2404 (2018) and in line with paragraph 12 of resolution 2048 (2012).

2. In fulfilment of the above request from the Security Council, the Department of Political Affairs undertook an assessment, in cooperation with the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS). During the same period, the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) concerning Guinea-Bissau visited Bissau from 25 to 27 June 2018. A representative of the Secretariat participated in the Chair's meetings with key stakeholders.

II. Key findings

3. Since my previous report, there have been some encouraging signs of progress towards the resolution of the political and institutional impasse in Guinea-Bissau. Consensus on a new inclusive Government has been achieved, plenary sessions of the National Assembly have resumed, a state budget has been adopted, and the date for holding legislative elections has been set for 18 November 2018. The appointment of Aristides Gomes as Prime Minister and the possibility that José Mario Vaz will be the first President to complete his term, for the first time since the independence of Guinea-Bissau in 1974, are both encouraging steps towards political stability. However, the country continues to face many challenges, including the need to clarify the constitutional separation of powers, fight the illegal trafficking of narcotics and undertake institutional reforms of the defence, security and justice sectors. There have been delays in the upcoming legislative and presidential elections, planned for 2018 and 2019, respectively, which should be close'y monitored, given their importance for political stability in Guinea-Bissau.

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4. The recommendations on the continuation of United Nations sanctions contained in my previous report remain valid and relevant. The root causes of instability have not been fully addressed and the political balance remains fragile, particularly in the light of the upcoming legislative and presidential elections. Those recommendations include: the maintenance of the present sanctions regime to signal to the people of Guinea-Bissau that the measures are applicable to all spoilers, regardless of their political or institutional affiliation, and that the Council stands ready to adjust the measures and designations as needed; the establishment of a panel of experts to support the Committee's work; the development of clear benchmarks for lifting sanctions; and a review of the designated individuals, to determine whether they continue to meet the listing criteria.

5. There is still broad consensus that sanctions have played, and continue to play, a positive role. They serve as a deterrent to the direct involvement of the security and defence forces in the political affairs of the country. However, some local interlocutors support the idea that the sanctions currently imposed on individuals should be reviewed, given the commendable behaviour of those individuals since 2012, and that those responsible for political instability and uncertainty should instead be designated for targeted measures. In this context, I take note of the decision of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) during its 53rd Summit, held on 31 July 2018 in Lomé, to lift the sanctions[1] it had imposed earlier, on 4 February, on 19 individuals in Guinea-Bissau, as part of efforts aimed at restoring democratic governance and ensuring respect for the rule of law in the country.

6. The military continues to respect the constitutional order and maintains a politically neutral role. It also continued to contribute to social activities and agricultural production, which gained the appreciation of the people of Guinea-Bissau. However, the risk of a military intervention could increase if important reforms in the security, defence and justice sectors are not implemented or if the security situation in the country deteriorates. Considering the positive conduct of the military subject to the travel ban, most interlocutors called for a review of the 2048 sanctions list.

7. International donors, financial institutions and development banks, including the World Bank, have also welcomed the progress made by Guinea-Bissau in breaking the political impasse.

8. Economic growth in the country remains generally positive, although the anticipated poorer cashew harvest, combined with the deterioration of basic public services, could pose social and economic challenges and may also worsen the level of food insecurity in upcoming months.

III. Sanctions in Guinea-Bissau

9. There have been no changes to the sanctions regime established by the Security Council pursuant to resolution 2048 (2012) since my previous report. The travel ban measure remains in place and the sanctions list of the Committee established contains the names of 10 individuals, all members of the "military command", responsible for the coup d'état of 12 April 2012.

10. During the past 12 months, the sanctioned individuals continued to perform their functions as part of the armed forces of Guinea-Bissau. The authorities of Guinea-

[1] Suspension from participation in ECOWAS activities; travel ban and denial of visas for these persons and their families; and freeze of the financial assets of these persons and their families wherever they may be.

Bissau confirmed that the Chief of General Staff of the Navy, Rear Admiral Sanha Clussé, died on 24 April 2016. He was removed from the sanctions list on 20 December 2017.

11. Since August 2017, there has been no indication of sanctioned individuals included on the 2048 sanctions list travelling outside Guinea-Bissau. The assessment also revealed that a misunderstanding remains regarding the scope of the travel ban restriction. It is important to note that travel that is justified on the grounds of humanitarian need, religious obligations or judicial process and undertaken in support of peace and national reconciliation may be approved on a case-by-case basis by the Committee (see resolution 2048 (2012), para. 5). Since my previous report, the Committee has not received any requests for any travel ban exemptions.

12. However, as repeatedly noted in my previous reports, the impact of sanctions in Guinea-Bissau has surpassed the travel ban restrictions imposed by resolution 2048 (2012). All interlocutors agreed that sanctions had had a positive effect in deterring the direct involvement of the armed forces in the political situation. At the same time, there were numerous calls for the possible application of sanctions to any individuals responsible for fomenting political instability within the country, including politicians and other civilians.

IV. Progress made with regard to the stabilization and restoration of constitutional order in Guinea-Bissau

13. Since my most recent report, significant political events and initiatives have taken place, which have eased the three-year political stalemate.

14. On separate occasions, ECOWAS ministerial delegations visited Bissau[2] to assess the implementation of the ECOWAS-brokered Conakry Agreement and meet with relevant stakeholders. On 4 February 2018, noting that the appointment of a consensus prime minister, as prescribed in the Conakry Agreement, had not been respected, the ECOWAS Authority imposed targeted sanctions on 19 individuals deemed to be obstructing the implementation of the Agreement. The Government reacted by describing the sanctions as "abusive" and in contrast with the governing principles of ECOWAS.

15. The imposition of the ECOWAS sanctions on the 19 individuals for impeding the implementation of the Conakry Agreement faced some public opposition. Subsequently, a petition in support of the 19 individuals was submitted to the ECOWAS Authority, requesting the lifting of measures, since the individuals could not be held accountable for the non-implementation of the Conakry Agreement. In addition, members of the Movement of Conscientious and Non-Conformist Citizens handed a petition to the ECOWAS representative in Bissau calling for President Vaz to be added to the sanctions list.

16. The African Union continued to closely monitor the situation in Guinea-Bissau. On several occasions, its Peace and Security Council expressed concern about the protracted crisis, calling on the country's political leadership to abide by its commitments, while underscoring the need for credible and transparent legislative and presidential elections, in accordance with constitutional timelines. On 29 March, the Peace and Security Council stressed that the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS should remain in force until the full implementation of the Conakry Agreement and requested ECOWAS to develop a mechanism to ensure that the imposed sanctions worked effectively.

[2] 1 and 2 December 2017, 16 January 2018 and 31 January 2018.

17. In the aftermath of the imposition of ECOWAS sanctions, and following consultations between the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde and the Party for Social Renewal under the aegis of the Catholic Bishop of Bissau, as well as decisions at the ECOWAS Summit of 14 April 2018, political stakeholders in Guinea-Bissau took a series of important political initiatives and decisions. They agreed on a date for holding legislative elections, the name of a consensus Prime Minister and the holding of an extraordinary session of the National Assembly to elect the new members of the National Electoral Commission and extend the current legislature until the November elections. President Vaz issued presidential decrees to dismiss Prime Minister Silva[3] and appoint Aristides Gomes in his place. The National Assembly met for the first time since December 2015 in plenary session and appointed José Pedro Sambú as President of the National Electoral Commission, while President Vaz appointed 26 members to the new Government, the programme and budget of which were subsequently approved by the National Assembly. On 30 April, President Vaz also appointed the former Minister of Interior, Botche Candé, who featured on the sanctions list of ECOWAS, as Minister of State and Presidential Adviser for Defence and Internal and External Security.

18. The African Union, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, ECOWAS, its Mediator, the European Union, the United Nations — under the leadership of my Representative for Guinea-Bissau and Head of UNIOGBIS — and the international community continued to support and encourage Guinea-Bissau in overcoming the political impasse. The ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau continued to be a considerable factor for stability and deterrence against possible spoilers. Welcoming the encouraging signs of progress made in addressing the political impasse, on 31 July 2018, the ECOWAS Authority lifted the sanctions previously imposed on 19 individuals.

19. Notwithstanding the progress achieved, the root causes of instability in Guinea-Bissau remain unaddressed and of concern. The political-military dynamics and ongoing political rivalries within political parties; ineffective State institutions and deficient rule of law; poverty and lack of access to basic services (particularly for women and youth); and impunity for those involved in previous military coups and related violence.

20. In addition, the ability of elected authorities, in particular the President, the Prime Minister and the President of the National Assembly, to constructively work together remains to be tested, especially in the context of reforms of the defence and security sectors and the justice system. Consensus among relevant political stakeholders remains fragile also with regard to the organizing of the next legislative elections, even though the technical and financial challenges that delayed the preparations for the electoral process have been largely resolved.

21. In addition, Guinea-Bissau and the region continue to suffer from issues related to transnational organized crime, including drug and human trafficking, which could present a concrete threat to stability and governance, especially since elements of the security and armed forces have in the past been allegedly involved in these illicit activities. President Vaz recently called for international support to the fight against drug trafficking.

[3] Artur Silva was appointed on 30 January 2018, succeeding Umaro Sissoco Embaló, who had resigned from the position on 12 January 2018.

V. Recommendations on the continuation of United Nations sanctions

22. Recent progress in the political situation in Guinea-Bissau is a positive and encouraging step forward towards stabilization. To date, the security situation remains stable, political tensions have not turned violent, and the military no longer interferes in political disputes. There appear to be no serious human rights concerns and constitutional order is not acutely threatened. However, I believe it is important to underscore that further efforts are required to achieve durable constitutional stability, and that these efforts will require inclusive and determined national ownership.

23. The recommendations on the continuation of United Nations sanctions contained in my previous report remain valid and relevant to the political situation in Guinea-Bissau today. In view of the upcoming legislative and presidential elections, the Security Council may wish to maintain the current designation criteria and send a clear message to the people of Guinea-Bissau that the sanctions regime is applicable to all spoilers, regardless of their political or institutional affiliation. The Council may also wish to consider further enhancing sanctions measures and designations, as and when required. It could also consider the establishment of a panel of experts in order to: deepen the information base for the Committee in order to promote greater awareness of the sanctions regime inside the country; identify those who meet the designation criteria for targeted measures, including by monitoring the proceeds from organized crime used to support individuals seeking to prevent the restoration of constitutional order; and assess the capacity of local authorities to monitor illicit trafficking and transnational criminal activities, given their potential impact on peace and stability within the country and the subregion.

24. Should the military, in particular the listed individuals, continue to play a positive role and refrain from interfering in national politics, including the upcoming elections in 2018–2019, the Security Council and its Committee may wish to review the sanctions list accordingly.

25. The second visit of the Chair of the Committee to Bissau, a year after the previous visit, was a strong signal of the Council's commitment to the people of Guinea-Bissau. It was also a sign of the Council's resolve to consider targeted sanctions in combination with other Charter-based instruments to peacefully resolve the political impasse in the country. Continued engagement by the Committee with local, regional and international actors, as well as United Nations system partners, including the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, is also recommended.

United Nations A/72/108–S/2018/792

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
7 September 2018
Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda item 44
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 29 August 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I transmit herewith two documents detailing the infringements of international air traffic regulations and violations of the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey (see annex I) and the illegal use of closed ports by Turkish warships (see annex II) during the month of July 2018.

I also wish to inform you that the regime installed by the occupying power in the area of Cyprus that it occupies illegally issued three notices to airmen relating to exercises conducted by the Turkish Air Force during the month of July 2018.

It should be noted that Turkish commercial aircraft systematically use the airport of Tympou, which has been operated illegally by the regime in the occupied areas since the closure of all ports of entry in said areas by the Cyprus Government.

In addition, Turkey continues to systematically harass civilian and military aircraft within the Nicosia flight information region via radio calls. At the same time, infringements of the Nicosia flight information region as well as violations of the national airspace of Cyprus continue unabated. Turkey's policy of persistently violating international law and breaching international rules and regulations is a constant threat to international peace and security that also has a negative impact on regional stability, jeopardizes the safety of international civil aviation and creates difficulties for air traffic over Cyprus and prevents the creation of an enabling environment in which to conduct the Cyprus peace process.

The said actions of Turkey, which has continued to occupy the northern part of the Republic of Cyprus since 1974, are clearly aimed at undermining Cyprus' sovereignty, consolidating the ongoing de facto division and upgrading the secessionist entity's status by claiming a purported airspace over the occupied territory of the Republic. In this respect, I would like to underline, once again, that there is only one legitimate Government in Cyprus, as stipulated in various Security Council resolutions (in particular resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984)), in which the Council declared legally invalid the purported secession of part of the Republic of Cyprus.

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On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest the continuing infringements of international air traffic regulations and the violations of the national airspace and the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey and appeal for their immediate cessation. The Republic of Cyprus reiterates, in this respect, its call for all States to respect Security Council resolutions and adhere to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

Finally, I would like to urge Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to contribute to a meaningful resumption of the peace process, instead of focusing on undermining the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and promoting Cyprus' partition through the creation of facts on the ground and the formalization of the status quo, as well as by seeking to politically upgrade the secessionist entity.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annexes as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Polly **Ioannou**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex I to the letter dated 29 August 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Air violations

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 July	0630–0709	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia flight information region (FIR) and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia area control centre (ACC)
	0753–0838	One B-350 King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
2 July	1435–1559	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1908–1924	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
3 July	0920–1111	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1704–1715	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
4 July	1001–1115	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1005–1110	One B-350 King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1046–1213	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
5 July	1037–1103	One UH-1 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1037–1222	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1148–1222	One B-350 King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
6 July	1050–1147	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1950–2040	One B-350 King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
7 July	1224–1344	One B-350 King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
8 July	0920–0950	One B-350 King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1020–1315	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
10 July	1332–1417	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1358–1703	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1410–1423	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1845–1904	One A-330 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	Time	Nature of violation
	1850–1910	One A-319 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1853–1912	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	2257–2308	One A-330 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	2301–2311	One A-319 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
11 July	0947–1103	One UH-1 Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1204–1226	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1804–1819	One C-130 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1921–2005	One B-350 King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
12 July	1020–1036	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1142–1211	One AB-412 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
13 July	0931–1230	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1004–1203	One AS-532 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1036–1247	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	2030–2107	One B-350 King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
14 July	0959–1050	One AS-532 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
15 July	1405–1443	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
16 July	1740–1801	One AB-412 Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
17 July	1033–1245	One Cougar Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1120–1241	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1130–1145	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1323–1422	Ten NF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1630–1642	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1850–1924	One B-350 King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
18 July	1000–1038	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1032–1052	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1225–1442	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1525–1818	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1533–1657	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1801–1840	Seven NF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1823–2050	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1939–2102	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	2225–0121	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
20 July	0001–0017	One GLF-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1052–1130	Two NF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1747–1836	Seven NF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	2208–2217	One GLF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
21 July	1037–1051	One A-400 Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1110–1133	Eight NF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1453–1505	One A-400 Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
22 July	1801–1826	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
23 July	2008–2022	One GLF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
24 July	1039–1200	One Huey Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1225–1236	One GLF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1307–1338	Two CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1356–1427	One A-400 Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1424–1738	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1530–1555	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1916–2232	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
25 July	0845–1242	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1010–1120	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1014–1030	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1443–1504	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1456–1514	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1623–1641	One B-200 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1746–1840	One B-350 King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1930–1957	One GLF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
26 July	0805–1042	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	0950–1024	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1014–1120	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1125–1201	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1604–1657	One CN-235 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1610–1700	Two F-16 and two F-4 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1627–1653	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1745–1833	One B-350 King Air Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
27 July	1430–1441	One GLF-5 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1643–1728	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
29 July	0101–0128	One A-400 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	0906–0935	One B-350 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations by entering the Nicosia FIR without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
30 July	1315–1403	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
31 July	1020–1055	One Turkish military helicopter infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC
	1950–2058	Two F-16 Turkish military aircraft infringed international air traffic regulations and violated the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by entering the Nicosia FIR and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus without diplomatic permit and without contacting the Nicosia ACC

Annex II to the letter dated 29 August 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Naval violations

Dates	*Nature of violation*
4–6 July	One A-1600 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta
4–7 July	One F-244 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
5–11 July	One P-332 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
6–8 July	One A-1600 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta
6–9 July	One A-595 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
13–15 July	One P-332 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
15–16 July	One P-332 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
17–21 July	One P-332 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
20–22 July	One Turkish submarine violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Keryneia while participating in celebrations of the anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus
20–22 July	One Turkish vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Keryneia while participating in celebrations of the anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus
20–22 July	One Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in celebrations of the anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus
21–24 July	One P-332 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
24–25 July	One A-1600 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta

Dates	*Nature of violation*
25–31 July	One Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces
27–28 July	One A-1600 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta
27–31 July	One F-512 Turkish missile vessel violated the territorial waters of the Republic of Cyprus and illegally used the closed port of Famagusta while participating in a naval operation of the occupation forces

United Nations S/2018/793

Security Council

Distr.: General
31 August 2018

Original: English

Identical letters dated 29 August 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to submit herewith a table clarifying the number of civilians killed and injured as a result of terrorist attacks, including those involving mortar shells and explosive devices, committed by armed terrorist groups against safe neighbourhoods in different Syrian cities and areas during the period from 22 July to 21 August 2018.

Governorate	*Number of civilians killed*	*Number of children killed among them*	*Number of civilians injured*	*Number of children injured among them*
Aleppo	27	5	33	9
Damascus	1		2	1
Dar'a	7	1	62	25
Dayr al-Zawr	5		6	5
Hama	7	6	8	5
Hasakah	2		2	
Homs	1		8	5
Idlib				
Ladhiqiyah				
Qunaytirah	2	1	4	2
Raqqah	1			
Rif Dimashq	3		11	9
Suwayda	245	1	196	2
Tartus				
Total	**301**	**14**	**332**	**63**

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-14434 (E) 040918

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United Nations S/2018/794

Security Council

Distr.: General
31 August 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 29 August 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am writing to you regarding the letter dated 24 August 2018 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2018/595), wherein my country has been accused of "interference in the internal affairs of the Republic of Yemen". I hereby vehemently reject such an allegation. At a time when Yemen is experiencing an all-out air, land and sea blockade by Saudi Arabia and its unabated air strikes, which completely disrupt the supply of humanitarian assistance thereto, accusing Iran of interference in the internal affairs of Yemen is but an unfounded claim.

It is evident that no amount of disinformation, fabrication and accusation can divert international attention from the war crimes and crimes against humanity that Saudi Arabia continues to commit in Yemen on a daily basis. The latest of such crimes was the killing of 31 civilians, including 26 children and 4 women, on 24 August 2018 in Ad-Durayhimi, the Yemeni province of Hudaida. Condemning this inhumane act in the strongest possible terms, the Islamic Republic of Iran calls for bringing its perpetrators to justice. The international community must compel Saudi Arabia to end its military and political interventions in, and lift the blockade against, Yemen.

Committed to the implementation of Security Council resolution 2140 (2014), the Islamic Republic of Iran will continue to strongly support a peaceful solution to the crisis in Yemen, which can be achieved only through an all-inclusive, Yemeni-led and Yemeni-owned national dialogue.

At the same time, I hope that the issues referred to in the aforementioned letter will not be used as a pretext to adversely affect the upcoming talks to be held on 6 September 2018 in Geneva, Switzerland.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gholamali **Khoshroo**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

18-14437 (E) 040918

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